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Beliefs and Personal
Experiences: Testing the
Model of Shattered
Assumptions
Mindi D. Foster
Wilfrid Laurier University
Lisa Sloto and Richard Ruby
West Chester University
We examined whether the model of shattered assumptions ( Janoff-Bulman, 1992) could be
applied to the reactions of victims of discrimination. Consistent with this model, it was
hypothesized that those whose positive world assumptions are inconsistent with their negative
experiences of discrimination would report more negative responses than those whose world
assumptions match their experience. Disadvantaged group (both gender and ethnicity)
members’ responses to discrimination (self-esteem, collective action, intergroup anxiety) were
predicted from their meritocracy beliefs and personal experiences of discrimination.
Regression analyses showed a significant interaction between meritocracy beliefs and personal
discrimination such that among those who reported personal discrimination, stronger beliefs
that the meritocracy exists predicted decreased self-esteem and collective action as well as
increased intergroup anxiety. Among those who reported little personal discrimination,
stronger beliefs that the meritocracy exists predicted increased self-esteem. Implications for
promoting a critical view of the social system is discussed.
keywords gender discrimination, meritocracy, shattered assumptions
IN C R E A S I N G evidence shows that discrimi-
nation based on group membership is associ-
ated with negative psychological consequences.
In particular, being the victim of discrimination 
is associated with negative mental health
Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
9:3; 401–411; DOI: 10.1177/1368430206064641
Author’s note
Address correspondence to Mindi D. Foster,
Psychology Department, Wilfrid Laurier
University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5
[email: mfoster@wlu.ca]
symptoms such as decreased self-esteem,
increased depression and anxiety (Branscombe,
1998; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999;
Dion, Dion, & Pak, 1992; Dion & Earn, 1975;
Foster, 2000; Klonoff, Landrine, & Campbell,
2000; Landrine, Klonoff, Gibbs, Manning, &
Lund, 1995; Pak, Dion & Dion, 1991; Schmitt,
Branscombe, Kobrynowicz & Owen, 2002) as
well as negative physical symptoms such as
headaches (Landrine, et al., 1995) and
increased blood pressure (Krieger & Sidney,
1996). Consequently, there is a need to
understand the factors that may serve to buffer
or diminish negative discrimination-related
symptoms.
According to stress and coping models (e.g.
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), one factor that
appears to affect the ways in which people
respond to a stressful event is their assumptions
about the world ( Janoff-Bulman, 1989, 1992;
Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983). Janoff-Bulman
refers to three sets of world assumptions.
People believe that they are personally invul-
nerable to negative events, that the world is
meaningful and just (i.e. that people get what
they deserve) and that they themselves are
worthy, good people. Distress occurs because
traumatic events violate these assumptions
( Janoff-Bulman, 1992). When one experiences
violence or disease, a sense of safety is lost and
victims fear future traumatic events (e.g.
Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974). Thus, the
assumption of personal invulnerability is shat-
tered. Victims who believe the world is just and
that they are good people struggle to under-
stand what they did to deserve such an experi-
ence. When ‘bad things happen to good
people’ (Kushner, 1981), the assumption that
the world is meaningful is shattered. In other
words, distress is experienced when a traumatic
event creates a mismatch between our beliefs
(how we think the world works) and our experi-
ences (how it does work, given the trauma).
The process of coping, according to Janoff-
Bulman, involves the process of changing one’s
assumptive world to match the experience.
When world assumptions and experiences are
more consistent, psychological well-being
increases.
An important question is whether we can
utilize this model for understanding the types
of people, beliefs and conditions under which
victims of discrimination will experience
decreased well-being. Granted, Janoff-Bulman
and Frieze (1983) themselves have explicitly
distinguished trauma victims from victims of
discrimination. They define victims of trauma
as those who have suffered life changes from
events such as crime, disease or natural disas-
ters, namely extreme or out of the ordinary
events. They note that while one can certainly
be a victim of discrimination, the victims of
extreme events may be very different.
However, there are reasons why the model of
shattered assumptions may also be very useful
for understanding the psychological reactions
of victims of discrimination (see also Major,
Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). First, models of
group consciousness do indeed refer to a stage
at which group members realize their previous
assumptions do not meet their current experi-
ences. For example, D. M. Taylor & McKirnan’s
Five Stage Model (1984) refers to a ‘conscious-
ness-raising stage’ where disadvantaged group
members who have been unable to attain
success (experience of discrimination) no
longer believe that individual successes are a
function of individual ability or effort (i.e. a
justice world assumption). Feminist conscious-
ness models further suggest that this can often
be an ‘a-ha’ experience that is shocking and dif-
ficult for women to accept (e.g. Bartky, 1977;
Bowles & Duelli Klein, 1983; Downing &
Rousch, 1985). Thus, group consciousness
models also make references to the shattering
of assumptions and its implications.
Second, the world assumptions of personal
invulnerability and the world as a meaningful
place are indeed relevant to victims of discrimi-
nation. The robust finding that victims of dis-
crimination maintain the belief that they
personally experience less discrimination than
the rest of their group (e.g. Crosby, 1984; D. M.
Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990)
suggests that discrimination victims maintain
assumptions of personal invulnerability. At the
same time however, this assumption can cer-
tainly be violated, as evidenced by disadvantaged
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group members who anticipate experiencing
discrimination (Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998)
and those who report that their experiences of
discrimination are pervasive across time and
contexts (Branscombe, et al., 1999). For these
reasons, the model of shattered assumptions
may also be relevant for discrimination victims.
Some evidence suggests that maintaining
positive world assumptions will help to buffer
disadvantaged group members in that such
assumptions appear to reduce disadvantaged
group members’ perceptions of discrimination.
For example, high believers in a just world have
reported reduced group (Birt & Dion, 1987;
Dalbert, Fisch, & Montada, 1992; Hafer &
Olson, 1993) and personal discrimination
(Lipkus & Siegler, 1992). Ethnic minorities who
believe that disadvantaged groups can attain a
higher status reported decreased perceptions
of personal discrimination (Study 1; Major,
Gramzow et al., 2002). In Study 2, participants
were told they would be assigned the role of 
‘co-manager’ (i.e. desirable status) or ‘clerk’
(i.e. undesirable) by a student already assigned
the role of ‘manager’. The more Latin
American participants believed in individual
mobility, the less likely they were to define their
rejection by the European-American manager
as discrimination. As such, we might expect that
holding positive world assumptions may
enhance well-being among disadvantaged
group members. Indeed, if the perception of
the stressor itself is decreased (i.e. experience
of discrimination), then well-being increases.
The psychological benefits of positive world
assumptions however, may exist because the
assumptions being examined are in essence,
still unviolated or ‘unshattered’. That is, if
those who hold a world assumption perceive
little discrimination, then these are people for
whom their assumptions (that the world is just)
still match their experiences (low discrimi-
nation). Thus, for those who report little
experience with personal discrimination, world
as meaningful assumptions may be beneficial.
Yet, among those who do experience personal
discrimination, positive world assumptions may
be more damaging. It is those who experience
personal discrimination but hold positive world
assumptions who will likely be confronting a
mismatch between their experience and their
beliefs. As Janoff-Bulman’s model (1992)
suggests, it is this mismatch that will be associ-
ated with decreased well-being. To better
understand the consequences of shattered
assumptions for disadvantaged group members,
the present study therefore examined how
positive world assumptions predict responses to
discrimination among those who do, and do
not personally experience discrimination.
Operational definitions
There are indeed a variety of positive world
assumptions ( Janoff-Bulman, 1989), that have
also been referred to as ‘legitimacy beliefs’
( Jost & Major, 2001), system-justification beliefs
( Jost & Banaji, 1994) or hierarchy-enhancing
beliefs (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). We, however,
focused on meritocracy beliefs, as a belief that
is referred to by several authors as a persistent
ideology in North America (e.g. Jost & Banaji,
1994; Kleugal & Smith, 1986; Pratto, Sidanius,
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Meritocracy beliefs
are most commonly defined as a preference for
the merit principle, or an endorsement of merit
as an appropriate way of distributing goods
(Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002), which
reflects what people think should happen. In
contrast, we examined a belief or disbelief in
the existence of the meritocracy (Lalonde,
Doan & Patterson, 2000), reflecting what
people think does happen. We used the latter
definition as a world assumption because
although individuals may endorse the meritoc-
racy as a positive goal, they may or may not
assume that it has not been achieved. As such,
belief in the existence of the meritocracy
reflects an assumption about how the current
system operates.
For the outcome variables, we were inter-
ested in responses to discrimination that occur
across a variety of levels: individual (self-
esteem), group (collective action) and inter-
group (intergroup anxiety). First, theories of
coping with discrimination often examine the
consequences of discrimination for the individ-
ual’s self-esteem (e.g. Branscombe et al., 1999;
Foster et al. responding to discrimination
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Crocker & Major, 1989). For example, research
has shown that perceptions of chronic and per-
vasive discrimination are associated with lower
self-esteem (e.g. Branscombe et al., 1999;
Corning, 2002; Schmitt et al., 2002). Thus we
were interested in how meritocracy beliefs
would moderate this relationship. Second, we
were interested in the group-level conse-
quences of discrimination, namely collective
action. Collective action can be defined as any
behavior directed at enhancing the group
status, whether it is taken individually, or with
the group (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam,
1990). Given the relationship between stronger
perceptions of personal discrimination and
increased collective action (e.g. Foster &
Matheson, 1995, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger,
1996), we were interested in how meritocracy
beliefs would moderate this relationship.
Finally, discrimination can also have impli-
cations for how disadvantaged groups respond
to other groups. Theories of intergroup
relations (e.g. Social identity theory; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979; Equity theory; Walster, Walster, &
Berscheid, 1978) state that when an identity
threat or a perceived inequity such as discrimi-
nation exists, group members try to restore
their positive identity or sense of equity. Among
the possible ways to do so is to assimilate into
the advantaged group; by distancing oneself
from one’s disadvantage, a positive identity or
sense of equity can be attained. As such, we
were interested in the extent to which disadvan-
taged group members would distance them-
selves from disadvantage, in the form of
intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1985).
Although originally conceptualized as how
anxious dominant group members may feel
among minority group members, we examined
disadvantaged group members’ anxiety about
being around other disadvantaged group
members, as an estimate of how much partici-
pants distance themselves from disadvantage in
general.
Hypotheses
We expected an interaction between meritoc-
racy beliefs and personal discrimination on
responses to discrimination (self-esteem, collec-
tive action, intergroup anxiety) (see Figure 1
for hypothesized interaction). As Janoff-
Bulman’s (1992) model suggests, psychological
distress is a function of the mismatch between
how one thinks the world works (positive world
assumptions) and how it does work (negative
experiences). In contrast, the coping process is
begun when one’s assumptive world changes to
match one’s experiences. Thus, we expected
that among those who have experienced dis-
crimination, those who believe the meritocracy
exists (mismatch) will report lower self-esteem
and collective action as well as increased inter-
group anxiety than those who disbelieve the
meritocracy exists.
Similar hypotheses were made about how
meritocracy beliefs may affect well-being among
those who have not experienced personal dis-
crimination. Those who have not experienced
discrimination and believe the meritocracy
exists are reporting experiences that are con-
sistent with their beliefs, and likely have un-
shattered assumptions. In contrast, those who
have not experienced personal discrimination
but disbelieve the meritocracy exists are report-
ing a mismatch between their experiences (no
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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Figure 1. Hypothesized interaction between
perceived personal discrimination and meritocracy
beliefs.
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discrimination) and beliefs (the system does
not provide equal opportunities to all groups).
Moreover, such negative expectations, despite
no negative experience may reflect a pessimistic
world view, which often has negative mental
health effects (e.g. S. E. Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Thus, we expected that among those who have
not experienced discrimination, believers in
the meritocracy would report greater self-
esteem, collective action and less intergroup
anxiety than disbelievers.
Method
Participants and procedure Participants (N =
138; 117 female, 21 male) at West Chester
University were recruited via posters in the psy-
chology department, that requested students
who belonged to disadvantaged (either ethnic
or gender) groups to sign up to complete a
questionnaire on their social and personal
opinions. Incentive to participate was a US$150
lottery. Reported ethnicity/gender categories
were African American (36%), European
American women (48.8%), Asian American
(4%), Latin American (1%) and 10.2%
described themselves as ‘other’ or ‘minority’.
Participants signed informed consent, com-
pleted the questionnaire and were given oral
and written debriefing.
Materials
For all the scales that followed, participants
were instructed which reference group to use
when evaluating each item. If they had identi-
fied themselves as an ethnic minority, they were
asked to compare themselves to society’s
majority/dominant ethnic group. If they had
identified gender as their disadvantaged group,
they were asked to compare themselves with
men.
Meritocracy beliefs Four items from Lalonde
et al.’s (2000) Belief in meritocracy ideology
scale were rated using a 7-point scale (strongly
disagree to strongly agree). Items were: ‘Every-
body in this country has equal opportunities’,
‘If you are a member of a “minority group” you
can climb the ladder of success only so far’,
‘Many social barriers prevent “minority groups”
from getting ahead’, ‘Our present social system
works to the disadvantage of people from
visible minorities’. Items were recoded so that
higher scores reflected the belief that the mer-
itocracy exists. The sum of the items was used
as the overall score (Cronbach alpha = .71).
Personal discrimination (Foster & Matheson,
1995) Using a 7-point scale (strongly disagree
to strongly agree), nine items assessed the
extent to which participants have personally
experienced discrimination based on their
group membership. Example items included,
‘The majority group have more employment
opportunities than I do’, and ‘I have less power
than most majority group members’. The sum
of the items was used as the overall score
(Cronbach alpha = .80).
State self-esteem scale (SSES; Heatherton &
Polivy, 1991) To assess self-esteem, the per-
formance and social subscales of the SSES were
used. Participants were asked to consider what
was true of them at that moment and rated 14
items using a scale ranging from ‘not at all’ (0)
to ‘extremely’ (4). Sample items included ‘I
feel confident about my abilities’; ‘I feel that I
have less scholastic ability right now than
others’; ‘I feel inferior to others at this
moment’; and ‘I feel concerned about the
impression I am making’. An overall self-esteem
score was computed using the sum of the items
(Cronbach alpha = .87).
Collective actions (Foster & Matheson, 1995)
Using a 7-point scale (‘never participate in’ to
‘always participate in’), participants rated 25
actions aimed at enhancing group status.
Actions range from low-risk behaviors (e.g. ‘I go
out of my way to collect information on
minority issues’) to higher risk behaviours (e.g.
‘I organize events that deal with minority
issues’). The sum across all items was used as
the overall score (Cronbach alpha = .93).
Intergroup anxiety (Britt, Boniecki, Vescio,
Biernat, & Brown, 1996) Using a 7-point scale
(‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’), participants
responded to 11 items that were reworded to
Foster et al. responding to discrimination
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assess disadvantaged group members’ anxiety
about being around other disadvantaged group
members. Example items included ‘I would feel
nervous if I had to sit alone in a room with
some other minorities’ and ‘I can interact with
other minorities without experiencing much
anxiety’. The sum of the items was used as the
overall score (Cronbach alpha = .74).
Results
To test how personal discrimination and beliefs
about the meritocracy predicted responses to
discrimination, several regression analyses were
conducted on the combined sample.1 The pre-
dictor variables were centered and entered
onto the first step and their product term was
entered onto the second step (Aiken & West,
1991). Table 1 shows the intercorrelations
among the variables and Table 2 summarizes
the regressions. Significant interactions were
plotted using the method of Cohen and Cohen
(1983) and the simple slopes were tested as
described in Aiken and West (1991).
Self-esteem
There were no significant main effects
(F(2,130) = 0.88, p = .42). There was, however,
a significant interaction predicting 8.9% of the
variability in self-esteem (F(1,129) = 12.94, p =
.0001) (see Figure 2). Both simple effects were
significant. Among those who reported high
personal discrimination, a stronger belief that
the meritocracy exists was associated with lower
self-esteem ( = –.34; t(131) = –2.77, p = .006).
Thus, consistent with expectations, those whose
experiences and beliefs were inconsistent
reported lower self-esteem than those whose
experiences and beliefs were consistent. Among
those who reported little personal discrimi-
nation, stronger beliefs that the meritocracy
exists (i.e. matched experiences and beliefs)
was associated with greater self-esteem ( = .25;
t(131) = 2.057, p = .042).
Collective action
The main effects predicted 20.1% of the vari-
ability in collective action (F(2,130) = 16.31, p =
.0001) (see Figure 3). Only perceived personal
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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Table 1. Intercorrelations among variables 
1 2 3 4 5
1. Personal discrimination
2. Meritocracy beliefs –.47** –..
3. Self-esteem .14** –.10** –..
4. Collective action .44** –.27** .37** –..
5. Intergroup anxiety –.11** .08** –.33** –.40** –
Table 2. Summary of hierarchical regressions 
Predicted Predictors r B Beta R2 change
Intergroup anxiety Meritocracy beliefs .10 .67 .06
Discrimination –.11 –.44 –.04 .014 
Interaction .28** 2.77** .27** .073** 
Self-esteem Meritocracy beliefs –.09 –.31 –.04
Discrimination .14 .53 .08 .021
Interaction –.33** –2.06** –.31** .095** 
Collective action Meritocracy beliefs –.27 –2.32 –.08
Discrimination .44** 10.28** .38** .201**
Interaction –.32** –6.80** –.26** .067**
discrimination uniquely predicted collective
action such that the more personal discrimi-
nation reported, the more collective action was
reported ( = .40; p = .001). This was qualified
by a significant interaction that predicted an
additional 6.7% of the variability in collective
action. Consistent with expectations, there was
a simple effect of meritocracy beliefs among
those who have experienced personal discrimi-
nation such that a stronger belief in the meri-
tocracy was associated with lower action-taking 
( = –.33; t(131) = –2.95, p = .004), again sug-
gesting that those with a mismatch between
experiences and beliefs took less action. There
was no simple effect among those who reported
low personal discrimination ( = .16; t(131) =
1.45, p = .147).
Intergroup anxiety
Again there were no significant main effects
(F(2, 126) = .884, p = .42), yet there was the
expected interaction, predicting 7.3% of the
variability in intergroup anxiety (F(1,125) =
9.98, p = .002) (see Figure 4). Among those who
perceived personal discrimination, stronger
beliefs that the meritocracy exists was associated
with greater intergroup anxiety,  = .32, t(128)
= 2.50, p = .014. Thus, consistent with expec-
tations, those whose negative experiences were
inconsistent with their beliefs reported greater
discomfort with other disadvantaged groups
than those whose experiences and beliefs were
consistent. Among those who perceived little
personal discrimination, meritocracy beliefs
were not associated with intergroup anxiety 
 = –.19, t(128) = –1.53, p = .128.
Discussion
Across all of the dependent variables, expec-
tations about those who reported personal dis-
crimination were confirmed. Compared to
Foster et al. responding to discrimination
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Figure 2. Interaction between perceived personal
discrimination and meritocracy beliefs on self-esteem.
Figure 3. Interaction between perceived personal
discrimination and meritocracy beliefs on collective
action.
Figure 4. Interaction of perceived personal
discrimination and meritocracy beliefs on
intergroup anxiety.
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those whose reported experiences and beliefs
were consistent, those whose experiences of dis-
crimination did not match their beliefs that the
meritocracy exists reported less self-esteem and
greater intergroup anxiety, suggesting that they
appeared to feel greater discomfort not only
with themselves, but with others who also
experience discrimination. Consistent with
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979),
this may suggest that the experience of dis-
crimination creates a negative social identity,
and identifying with others who experience dis-
crimination may increase the threat of discrimi-
nation for themselves. As such, disadvantaged
group members may choose to dissociate with
others experiencing disadvantage. A discomfort
with others’ disadvantage may also explain this
group’s decreased participation in collective
action; if they are trying to distance themselves
from disadvantage participating in actions to
reduce disadvantage are unlikely. Importantly,
these data are also consistent with Janoff-
Bulman’s (1992) model of trauma. Those who
believe the meritocracy exists but experience
discrimination may be a group whose negative
experiences are shattering their world assump-
tions, and such are experiencing greater
distress, not only on a psychological level, but a
social one.
In contrast, those with discrimination experi-
ences that were consistent with their beliefs that
the meritocracy does not exist reported more
positive responses to discrimination (increased
self-esteem and action, decreased intergroup
anxiety). This group of individuals may be, as
Janoff-Bulman (1992) suggests, those who have
begun the coping process by changing their
world assumptions to be more consistent with
their own experiences. The shock of shattered
assumptions may have passed and as such,
psychological and social well-being may ensue.
This suggests that encouraging a disbelief in
the meritocracy may be a useful educational
tool to enhance psychological, social and inter-
group benefits for those experiencing discrimi-
nation. If victims of discrimination can be
encouraged to have a critical view of the system,
perhaps the coping process can begin before
the consequences become more severe (e.g.
depression, Landrine et al., 1995; high blood
pressure, Krieger & Sidney, 1996).
Also as expected, those who reported little
personal discrimination and believe the meri-
tocracy exists, reported greater self esteem than
disbelievers. These may be individuals for
whom assumptions are unshattered, and as
such, increased well-being would be expected.
In contrast, the fact that disbelievers reported
lower self-esteem suggests that being critical of
the meritocracy may not be useful for disadvan-
taged group members who have not yet experi-
enced discrimination. This may be, as
Janoff-Bulman’s model would suggest, because
this group is reporting a mismatch between
experiences and beliefs. They believe that the
system is unfair to disadvantaged groups, yet do
not have the personal experience that would be
expected to facilitate such a belief. Much like
the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, this
inconsistency (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959)
may be distressing. Alternatively, this may be a
group of people who are somewhat pessimistic,
namely those who have negative beliefs about
the world despite the lack of negative experi-
ence. Thus, while a critical view of the system
may be helpful for victims, it may only serve to
maintain negativity for non-victims.
However, it may be premature to recommend
that a critical view of the system is not useful for
non-victims. There may be conditions under
which being critical of the system is positive for
those who have not yet experienced discrimi-
nation. Janoff-Bulman (1992) suggests that
those for whom world assumptions have already
been challenged, coping may be easier once a
traumatic event occurs. For example, a woman
who had not previously experienced discrimi-
nation may cope better upon experiencing an
acute situation such as sexual harassment if she
is already critical of the social system, than a
woman who is not critical. Consistent with this,
our recent work (Foster & Tsarfati, 2005) has
examined how women who reported no prior
experiences with discrimination, and who
either believed or disbelieved the meritocracy
exists, would respond to an acute laboratory
situation of discrimination. Results showed that
those with no prior experience, but disbelieved
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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the meritocracy exists, showed greater well-
being upon experiencing acute discrimination
than believers. Together, these studies suggest
that being critical of the social system may not
be helpful for disadvantaged group members
until discrimination actually occurs, at which
time such beliefs may buffer the negative conse-
quences of discrimination.
One difficulty with applying the model of
shattered assumptions ( Janoff-Bulman, 1992)
to victims of discrimination is that shattered
assumptions may be more difficult to categorize
than for victims of an acute trauma. For victims
of an extreme experience such as disease or
violence, the salience of the event is more
apparent and therefore the moment at which
assumptions become shattered may also be
apparent. In contrast, for victims of discrimi-
nation, this distinction may be less obvious.
Some victims may experience an extreme form
of discrimination such as rape, or harassment,
while many others experience more subtle,
everyday events such as sexist comments and
sexual objectification (Swim, Hyers, Cohen &
Ferguson, 2001). The point at which assump-
tions are shattered may therefore be more dif-
ficult to ascertain. Further, Janoff-Bulman’s
(1992) model, as with most models of coping,
is a process model. It is indeed difficult to
capture each moment of the process as it occurs
using a crosssectional design. Our future
research will examine these issues using a
methodology (i.e. diary studies) that is more
able to capture the dynamic coping process.
Despite these limitations however, this study
suggests that models of coping with other trau-
matic events may also be useful for understand-
ing who will experience discrimination-related
distress and who may be buffered. Thus,
although there will no doubt be differences
among victims of different forms of trauma,
there also appear to be similarities among
victims, whether the trauma is out of the
ordinary (e.g. natural disaster) or as common
as discrimination.
Notes
1. To test for a possible moderating effect of gender
and ethnicity, the two, three and four-way
interactions between personal discrimination,
meritocracy beliefs, sex and ethnicity were
conducted. The moderating effects of sex and/or
ethnicity were significant in only one case; there
was a significant sex by meritocracy beliefs
interaction (F(6, 119) = 3.61, p = .003), such that
among women, stronger beliefs that the
meritocracy exists was associated with decreased
collective action ( = –.42, p = .001). Among men,
there was a marginal relationship between
stronger belief that the meritocracy exists and
increased collective action ( = .42, p = .06). This
is consistent with social dominance (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1993) and system-justification (e.g. Jost &
Thompson, 2000) theories which suggest that
support for system-justifying beliefs will decrease
well-being for low status groups but increase 
well-being for high status groups. However, we are
cautious interpreting this effect given there were
only 21 men in the sample. For this reason, and
because no other moderating effects were found,
subsequent analyses were performed on the
combined sample.
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